Optimal protection-response strategies for urban subway stations against malicious attacks: a game theory approach

Babazadeh, Aref; Khademi, Navid; Behmanesh, Arian

doi:10.22059/ceij.2024.378678.2086

Optimal protection-response strategies for urban subway stations against malicious attacks: a game theory approach

Articles in Press

Authors

Aref Babazadeh ¹

Navid Khademi ²

Arian Behmanesh ¹

¹ School of Civil Engineering, College of Engineering, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran

² School of Civil Engineering College of Engineering University of Tehran Tehran, Iran

10.22059/ceij.2024.378678.2086

Abstract

This paper introduces a defender-attacker-defender model grounded in game theory to determine optimal strategies for protecting urban rail systems against deliberate attacks on Metro stations. The model integrates four key players in a quad-level framework: the system manager, who allocates limited security resources; the attacker, who targets the most vulnerable station to maximize disruption; the system operator, who implements strategies to mitigate the impact of attacks; and the public transit passengers, whose travel behavior influences the overall network performance. The study explores four scenarios based on varying levels of protection (full or partial) and operator intelligence (intelligent or non-intelligent). Each scenario is analyzed using a tailored algorithm and applied to the public transit network of Shiraz, Iran, as a case study. The findings reveal that an intelligent operator, capable of anticipating the attacker’s moves, significantly mitigates the attack's impact. Furthermore, distributing the security budget across all stations rather than focusing on a select few provides superior protection. This model offers a robust framework for developing effective defense strategies against intentional attacks on urban rail infrastructure.

Keywords

Metro system security

Game theory

Semi-flexible bus system

Bus bridging

Network vulnerability

Subjects